Data Processing

Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual by Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz

By Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz

The 3 volume-set, LNCS 9814, LNCS 9815, and LNCS 9816, constitutes the refereed court cases of the thirty sixth Annual foreign Cryptology convention, CRYPTO 2016, held in Santa Barbara, CA, united states, in August 2016.

The 70 revised complete papers awarded have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 274 submissions. The papers are prepared within the following topical sections: provable safeguard for symmetric cryptography; uneven cryptography and cryptanalysis; cryptography in conception and perform; compromised structures; symmetric cryptanalysis; algorithmic quantity idea; symmetric primitives; uneven cryptography; symmetric cryptography; cryptanalytic instruments; hardware-oriented cryptography; safe computation and protocols; obfuscation; quantum thoughts; spooky encryption; IBE, ABE, and useful encryption; automatic instruments and synthesis; 0 wisdom; theory.

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Additional resources for Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part I

Example text

St ), and the proof of Lemma 4 can actually compute the exact value of this expectation. Hence, from Lemmas 1, 3, and 4, to get our bound for Case 1, it suffices to prove that Pr[S ∈ Γbad ] ≤ (t + 1)qp1 · · · pt /N t . (18) To justify Eq. (18), let S = (S0 , . . , St ). If S ∈ Γbad then τ must contain entries (enc, x, y), (prim, 1, u1 , v1 ), (prim, 2, u2 , v2 ), . . , (prim, t, ut , vt ) such that one of the following happens: • u1 = x ⊕ S0 , and ui = vi−1 ⊕ Si for every i ∈ {2, . . , t}, or • vt = y ⊕ St , and ui = vi−1 ⊕ Si for every i ∈ {2, .

PS1 (τ, s) pS1 (R(τ, s)) But from the induction hypothesis, 1− pS0 (R(τ, s)) 4t−1 q ≤ t−1 pS1 (R(τ, s)) N pj . 2 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Fig. 4. Mu PRP security of 10-round KAC on 128-bit strings. From left to right: the naive bound by using the hybrid argument with CS’s result, the naive bound by using the hybrid argument with the su PRP result in Theorem 1, and the bound in Theorem 2. We set p = q = u, where u is the number of users. The x-axis gives the log (base 2) of p, and the y-axis gives upper bounds on the mu PRP security of KAC.

The question now is: how do we feed the nonce, the IV, and the i-th counter to the TBC in order to create the mask that will be xored to the i-th message block? We considered several possibilities (we do not claim this to be exhaustive): (a) One can put the nonce in the tweak input, and the sum of the IV and the counter in the plaintext input. The problem is that confidentiality caps at birthday bound even in the nonce-respecting scenario: the adversary can query the encryption of a single message with 2n/2 equal blocks, and observe that no collision occurs in the corresponding ciphertext blocks (since the nonce is fixed and all TBC calls use the same tweak), which will distinguish the ciphertext from a random string (for which a collision would be expected).

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